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COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM 
Environmental Offences: Finally Making the Polluter Pay? 
 
Opi Outhwaite 
 
 
This update focuses on developments in sentencing for environmental crimes. The 
imposition of appropriate penalties is crucial, not only to the use of judicial mechanisms for 
securing access to environmental justice, but also to respect for the polluter pays principle, a 
keystone of environmental law. There has been long-standing criticism in the UK of the 
failure of the courts to treat environmental crimes sufficiently seriously when imposing 
sentences.  Fisher et al observed that insufficiently severe sentences, including low levels of 
fines, undermine the effectiveness of criminal prosecutions, reinforce an attitude of moral 
ambiguity towards environmental crime and do not produce a deterrent effect.1  The issues 
relate to sentencing for both individuals and businesses, though the latter has arguably been 
the most problematic. Two important facets of this problem have both been addressed this 
year, through developments in sentencing guidance and in decisions of the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal and Sentences for Corporate Offenders 
The Court of Appeal has established something of a track record for reducing the fines 
imposed upon companies by the lower courts. One of the best known examples of this is the 
Sea Empress case.2  A record fine of £4 million was imposed on the Milford Haven Port 
Authority as a result of the Sea Empress oil disaster. On appeal the fine was reduced to 
£750,000. This has been seen to reflect a general reluctance of the courts to impose serious 
penalties on corporate environmental offenders and for environmental crimes in general. 
The Court of Appeal, in considering the penalty, held that the judge had failed to give 
sufficient credit for the Port’s plea of guilty, failed to consider the impact of such a large fine 
on the ability of the Port Authority to perform its public functions, and that it had taken too 
rosy a view of the Port’s financial situation.  These considerations are pertinent to the recent 
decisions, discussed below. 
 
                                                
1
 Fisher, E. et al, Environmental Law: text, cases and materials, Oxford: OUP (2013).  
2
 R v Milford Haven Port Authority (The Sea Empress) [2000] Env L.R. 632. 
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As noted by Stookes, this approach of the Court of Appeal has been observed in more 
recent cases. In R v Anglian Water Services Ltd3 the defendant company pleaded guilty to 
discharging effluent into a watercourse and was fined £200,000 by the Crown Court. The 
Court of Appeal reduced the fine to £60,000. In R v Cemex Ltd a company failed to comply 
with an environmental permit and was fined £400,000.4 The fine was reduced on appeal to 
£50,000.5 Stookes notes that this position has resulted in some offenders being prepared to 
risk paying a fine rather than comply with environmental legislation.  
 
In January 2014 three important Court of Appeal decisions dealt with the imposition of fines 
for corporate environmental offences and suggest a marked change in attitude as well as 
establishing important general principles for fines applied to corporate offenders.6  
 
R v Sellafield Ltd and R v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd were heard together; in both cases 
the issue was whether fines imposed were ‘manifestly excessive’.7 Reviewing the general 
principles relating to the duty of the courts in sentencing, as set out in the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, it was noted that the purpose of sentencing included punishment of offenders, 
reduction of crime (including through deterrence), reform and rehabilitation of offenders, 
protection of the public and the making of reparation for harm caused.8 The culpability of the 
offender and the harm caused or which might foreseeably be caused were to be regarded 
when considering the seriousness of the offence9 and when imposing a fine, the criteria set 
out in s.164 should be considered, including the financial circumstances of the offender and 
the seriousness of the offence (which may have the effect of increasing or reducing the fine). 
Citing R v F Howe & Son (Engineers) Ltd10 the court emphasised that the fine must be fixed 
to meet the statutory purposes with the objective of ensuring that ‘the message is brought 
home to the directors and members of the company (usually the shareholders)’.11 
                                                
3
 [2003] EWCA Crim 2243. 
4
 [2007] EWCA Crim 1759. 
5
 Stookes, P. Will the polluter finally pay the price? Solicitors Journal, 28 October 2014. 
6
 Likely influenced by the then forthcoming developments in sentencing guidelines which were 
introduced in July 2014 and are discussed below.  
7
 R v Sellafield Ltd and R v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2014] EWCA Crim 49. 
8
 s.142 CJA 2003. Ibid at [3]. 
9
 s.143 CJA 2003. Ibid at [3]. 
10
 [1999] 2 All ER 249. 
11
 [2014] EWCA Crim 49 [6]. 
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In Sellafield, the company had adopted a system for separating exempt and non-exempt 
(radioactive) waste according to the statutory framework. Exempt waste could be disposed 
of as landfill whereas radioactive waste was subject to separate processes. The equipment 
introduced for the purpose of categorising the waste was not correctly calibrated so that the 
dosage always registered as zero and the waste in question was consequently set aside for 
disposal as exempt waste. The error was discovered by chance, during a training exercise. 
In the intervening period several thousand bags of waste had passed through, though it was 
accepted that only a small number of bags were radioactive above the level that should have 
been detected. The Court of Appeal accepted that Sellafield then did everything they could 
to ensure that no harm came to anyone.12 
 
With respect to harm and culpability the court considered that there was no actual harm and 
the risk of harm was low. Culpability was considered to be ‘medium’; the court agreed that 
Sellafield that the failures could easily have been avoided and should have been detected 
quickly, though the application of specified monitoring and checking procedures.13 
 
Network Rail involved health and safety failures rather than specifically an environmental 
issue but the sentencing principles were applied in the same way as for Sellafield. A child 
was seriously injured when the car he was in was hit by a train at a level crossing. National 
Rail accepted that it was guilty of significant failings in the assessment of risk; if a proper 
assessment had been made then a telephone connected to the signal box would have been 
installed at the crossing (and was installed after the accident). Guidance on risk assessment 
had been issued in 1996 and risk assessments were undertaken in 2000, 2003, 2007 and 
2009. There was a maintenance inspection in 2010. The Crown Court considered, and Court 
of Appeal accepted, that ‘elementary mistakes’ were made in the assessment. 
 
In appealing against the fine Network Rail submitted that since a guilty plea was entered (a 
mitigating factor) the starting point was far too high and further, the judge had not given 
sufficient credit for Network Rail's commitment to safety. The Court of Appeal found that 
serious harm was foreseeable, in addition to the actual harm caused. As to culpability there 
was no evidence of specific management failures; the failures were at lower operational 
levels. 
 
                                                
12
 [2014] EWCA Crim 49 [21]. 
13
 [2014] EWCA Crim 49 [31]. 
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Having considered culpability and harm, and aggravating and mitigating factors in both 
cases, the Court of Appeal turned to the issue of whether the fines were excessive. 
Concerning Sellafield, the Court of Appeal made it very clear that significant fines could be 
appropriate to large companies of this type. A fine of £700,000 (reduced from a starting point 
of £1 million, after mitigation) reflected the case where culpability was moderate and harm 
low; it should achieve the purpose of sentencing by bringing home to Sellafield Ltd and its 
shareholders the seriousness of the offences committed and should act as an incentive to 
directors and shareholders to remedy the failures found, including the too lax and 
complacent approach of management. If it did not have that effect then in a future case the 
fine would have to reflect that the level imposed in this case had not achieved the statutory 
purpose of sentencing. The Court noted also that there was no upper ceiling on the 
maximum fine that could be imposed on a company. 
 
Concerning Network Rail the Court of Appeal rejected the submission that a fine of £750000 
(before mitigation) was appropriate only where there had been a fatality. But, differently to 
Sellafield, it was noted that a significant fine would inflict no direct punishment on anyone, 
and may harm the public, since the company’s profits are reinvested in the rail infrastructure 
rather than benefiting shareholders. Nevertheless to ensure that it fulfils the other purposes 
of sentencing (reducing offences, reforming the offender and protecting the public) the fine 
must be such that it brings home to the directors and members of Network Rail those three 
purposes. The fine would stand and indeed ‘represented a very generous discount for the 
mitigation’14 – even if there had been a materially greater fine it would not have been 
criticised. 
 
Finally, R v Southern Water Services Ltd15 concerned failings at a sewage pumping station 
which led to the discharge of untreated sewage into the sea. Concerning culpability there 
had been a failure to notify and remedy the problems quickly, as found by the trial judge. 
Although there was no actual harm, there was the potential for serious harm. Again the 
Court noted that the company had significant resources available to them and also a record 
of persistent offending. In dismissing the appeal and upholding the original fine of £200,000 
the Court of Appeal commented that it would not interfere with the fine and would not have 
done so even if the fine had been substantially higher. 
 
                                                
14
 [2014] EWCA Crim 49 [72]. 
15
 [2014] EWCA Crim 120. 
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In all three cases the Court of Appeal gave significant weight to the considerable resources 
available to each company, even where the company did not owe a duty to shareholders. In 
particular, the impact of the fine - rather than only the ability to pay - was considered in 
relation to the purpose of sentencing. The Court also commented carefully on the record of 
persistent offending in each case. 
Sentencing for Environmental Offences: The New Guideline 
 
Also in 2014, the Sentencing Council issued its Definitive Guideline for environmental 
offences.16 The position of the Court of Appeal, discussed above, became relevant when the 
lower courts had imposed relatively substantial fines or penalties where environmental 
offences had been committed. These instances were often the exception however, with low 
levels of fines and inconsistent sentencing considered to be a persistent problem in the 
lower courts. 
 
In a detailed discussion of the data and issues pertaining to the consultation preceding the 
Guideline, Parpworth notes that empirical research undertaken by the Sentencing Council 
indicated a limited awareness among magistrates of the sentencing guidelines in relation to 
environmental offences.17 Further, the limited number of environmental cases heard by 
individual magistrates meant that they were unlikely to have substantial experience of the 
application of the guidance, leading to inconsistencies including in the level of fine imposed. 
The view of the Environment Agency was that fines would need to increase substantially for 
businesses to understand the environment’s true value, rather than viewing pollution as an 
acceptable risk. Similarly, the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee noted 
that the levels of fines imposed neither reflected the gravity of the environmental crimes nor 
deterred or adequately punished those who commit them.18  
 
                                                
16
 Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences: Definitive Guideline, [2014] available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Final_Environmental_Offences_Definitive_Guideline_%
28web%29.pdf. 
17
 Parpworth, N. 'Sentencing for environmental offences: a new dawn? Journal of Planning & 
Environmental Law [2013] 9, 1093. 
18
 Ibid and see further House of Commons, Environmental Crime and the Courts, (HC, 126, 6th report 
of the session 2003-04). 
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Although the data on sentencing was inadequate, Parpworth notes that the data analysis 
published alongside the consultation demonstrated that in most cases companies were 
sentenced by magistrates (82% of cases) and fines were the usual sentence (93% of 
sentences). In 2011 only 12% of corporate fines were above £10,000 and the median figure 
for 2001-2011 shows an overall downward trend from £2500 in 2001 to £1500 in 2011.  
 
Similarly, in 2011 the vast majority of individuals were sentenced by magistrates (90% of 
cases). Fines remain the most common sanction but have decreased from 78% to 65% of 
cases. In the period 2001- 2011 the mean fine imposed upon individual offenders decreased 
from £350 to £200. In the same period there has been an increase in the number of 
individuals receiving a discharge and slight increase in the imposition of community orders.19 
The new Guideline came into effect in July 2014 and applies to individual offenders and to 
organisations, with each addressed separately.  To determine the appropriate sentence the 
guideline specifies the range of sentences appropriate for each type of offence and divides 
each offence into categories according to the degree of seriousness. ‘Category ranges’ are 
then specified; the sentences appropriate for each level of seriousness. A starting point for 
sentences in each category is set out and then adjusted according to various factors.20 
 
Two main groups of offence are addressed: those committed under s.33 of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 and certain offences under the Environmental Permitting 
(England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (summarised in the Guideline as those dealing with 
unauthorised deposit, treatment or disposal of waste and illegal discharges to air, land and 
water). The guidance makes clear however that the Guideline should be referred to in 
sentencing “other relevant and analogous offences”. 
 
The guideline sets out a series of steps to be applied in determining the appropriate 
sentence - though there are some differences in the detail applicable to individuals as 
compared with organisations, the guidance is comparable. An important starting point is that 
steps one and two respectively require the court to consider making a compensation order 
                                                
19
 See Parpworth [n 17] and Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences Sentencing Data, Research 
and Analysis Bulletin available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Environmental_bulletin__Final.pdf. 
20
 It has been noted that the specification of starting points for sentences is unique to sentencing for 
England and Wales as compared with  jurisdictions such as the USA and New Zealand, see Parpwoth 
[n 17].  
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and to consider confiscation. This requirement is separate from the determination of any fine 
to be imposed.  
 
Steps three and four provide for categorisation of the offence and determination of the 
starting point and range for fines. In categorisation of the offence, a sliding scale of 
culpability and harm is used, with each including four categories. Culpability ranges are (i) 
deliberate (intentional breach or flagrant disregard or, for organisations, deliberate failure to 
put in place and enforce systems which could reasonably be expected), (ii) reckless (actual 
foresight, wilful blindness, reckless failure to put in place and enforce systems, (iii) negligent 
(failure to take reasonable steps) and (iv) low or no culpability. In determining culpability of 
organisations it should be noted that the ‘deliberate’ and ‘reckless’ categories apply to acts 
or omissions that can be properly attributed to the organisation. The categories of harm 
range from actual harm, such as a major adverse effect on air or water quality (category 1), 
through to risk of minor localised damage to air or water quality (Category 4). Risk of harm is 
presumed to be less serious than actual harm though it is recognised that this might not be 
the case where the extent of potential harm is particularly high.  
 
The combination of culpability and harm indicates the starting point for the determining the 
level of fine. For organisations the starting point and range is further divided according to the 
size of the organisation, ranging from ‘large’ (turnover or equivalent of at least £50million 
p/a) to ‘micro’ (turnover or equivalent of not more than £2million p/a). This provides a clear 
basis for imposing fines appropriate to the particular organisation in question, particularly 
when read with steps 5 - 7. To support this factor, detailed information about required 
accounting information is also set out. The guidance also provides that for ‘very large 
organisations’ the fine may be outside of the suggested range. This category is not defined 
except as one whose ‘turnover or equivalent vastly exceeds the threshold for large 
companies’. The lack of a starting point for fines in this category might be problematic but 
read as a whole the clear assumption in the guidance is that the starting point will be 
proportionately higher than for large organisations. 
 
In steps 5 - 7 the Court is required to ‘step back’ and, with reference to the specific factors 
set out, review whether the sentence as a whole meets the objectives of punishment, 
deterrence, and removal of gain derived through the commission of an offence. Certain new 
criteria are set out in these steps which should support the more effective use of fines, 
particularly for offending organisations. Step five sets out new guidance to ensure ‘that the 
combination of financial orders...removes any economic benefit derived from the offending’.  
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Economic benefits expressly include avoided costs, operating savings and any gains made 
as a direct result of the offence. For organisations (but also for individuals) this step is 
important in preventing economic gains derived from ‘cutting corners’ or failing to comply in 
the context of calculated financial risk. 
 
The requirement that the fine meets the objectives of sentencing of organisations is enforced 
further in step six. Here the court is required to ensure that the fine based on turnover is 
proportionate to the means of the offender. The language of proportionality in this section 
errs towards environmental protection rather than the interests of the organisation. The 
guideline does, however, allow for a ‘bespoke’ approach; in assessing the financial situation 
of the organisation, the profit margins of the organisation should be examined and not only 
the overall turnover, with an upward or downward adjustment of the fine accordingly.21 This 
allows for appropriate adjustment based on the circumstances of the case. The combination 
of financial orders must though be ‘sufficiently substantial to have a real economic impact 
which will bring home to both management and shareholders the need to improve regulatory 
compliance’. In some cases, putting the offender out of business will be an acceptable 
consequence of the fine.   
 
The non-exhaustive list of aggravating factors also includes addition of the offence having 
been committed for financial gain. Evidence of a wider impact or impact on the community is 
a further addition to the list of aggravating factors.22 Aggravating and mitigating factors will 
be used to adjust the starting point in step 4. The requirement to remove any economic gain 
similarly applies to individual offenders. 
Comment 
 
The developments in sentencing for environmental offences appear to indicate a welcome 
change in the consistency and seriousness with which they will be dealt by courts at all 
levels. A low level of fines and the reduction in high fines on appeal have been a persistent 
issue in UK environmental law and, as noted, are considered to have contributed to a view 
that environmental offences are not ‘serious’ crimes or are morally ambiguous. The 
                                                
21
 Brosnan notes that this has implications for the Environment Agency who will now need to 
investigate the financial circumstances of offenders in more detail in order to present supporting 
information to the court. Brosnan, A. ELR, 16, 3 (203) [2014] 
22
 Brosnan [2014], Ibid. 
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approach of the Court of Appeal in the cases discussed appears designed to turn the tide on 
organisations who might otherwise treat non-compliance as an acceptable business risk. 
The change in emphasis in the Court of Appeal to the purpose of sentencing and the need to 
‘bring the message home’ to corporate offenders - particularly those with access to 
considerable resources and a history of non-compliance - is also seen in the Sentencing 
Council's Definitive Guidelines for environmental offences. Since the vast majority of cases 
are heard in the lower courts and the usual sentence is the imposition of a fine, the 
Guideline also has far reaching implications. The detailed and structured approach to 
determining the category of offences and the overall level of fine to be imposed should 
provide greater consistency and it is widely thought that it will lead to an increase in the level 
of fine imposed on organisations.23 In particular, the more detailed guidance on the need to 
negate economic gains and to consider the in detail financial situation of the organisation in 
question goes to the heart of the purpose of sentencing and to the criticism levelled at lower 
levels of fine in not acting as an adequate punishment or deterrent.  
 
As might be expected, there are some limitations. The more vague reference to ‘very large 
organisations’ might cause difficulties. The requirement in step six for the court to examine 
the profit margins of a company provides an opportunity for an assessment which avoids 
injustice (both to the organisation and in relation to the harm or risk of harm) but might 
potentially be leaned on by large companies seeking to argue that they are operating with 
losses. Finally, the Guideline addresses some of the most common and potentially serious 
types of environmental offence but it is nevertheless restricted. Many other offences (for 
instance, those involving wildlife crime) are subject to similar problems with sentencing and 
are not addressed, though it remains to be seen how widely the courts will apply the 
principles set out in the Guideline.  
 
 
                                                
23
 Brosnan considers that the level of fines imposed on individuals will remain about the same (ibid). 
